Tiger Woods Needs to Need a Therapist (and Probably Does)

Tiger Woods is obviously having a terrible season.  His scoring average so far (71.66) is almost 2 strokes higher than his previous worst year (69.75 in 1997).  He has no wins, no top 3’s, and has only finished top 10 in 2 of 9 tournaments.  That 22%, if it holds up, would be the worst of his career by 20%.  For the first time basically ever, his eventually capturing the all-time major championships record is in doubt.  Of course, 9 tournaments is not a large sample, and this could just be a slump.  As I see it, there are basically 4 possibilities:

  1. Tiger is running very badly.
  2. Tiger is in serious decline.
  3. Tiger is declining somewhat and running somewhat badly.
  4. Tiger needs a shrink.

So the questions of the day are:  a) How likely are each of these possibilities? and b) What does each say about his chances of winning 19 majors?  For reasons I will explain, I believe 1 and 2 are very unlikely, and 3 is somewhat unlikely.  Which is fine, since Tiger should basically pray this is all in his head, because otherwise his chances of catching and passing Nicklaus are diminishing considerably.

I would normally be the first to promote a “bad variance” explanation of this kind of phenomena, but in this case: a) Tiger doesn’t really have slumps like this; and b) the timing is too much of a coincidence.  For some historical perspective, here’s a graph of Tiger’s overall winning %, top-10 finish %, and winning % in majors, by year:

tiger, phil and jack_3492_image001

For the record, his averages are 28.4%, 66.4% and 24.6%, respectively.  As should be obvious, not only is his 2010 historically awful, but there is nothing to suggest that he was in decline beforehand.  Despite having recently run slightly worse in majors than he did in the early 2000’s, his Win% and Top-10% trendlines have still been sloping upwards.
Of course, 2/3 of a season is still a small sample, and it is certainly possible that this is variance, but just because something *could* be a statistical artifact doesn’t mean that it is *likely* to be.  In fact, one problem with statistically-oriented sports analysis is that its proponents can sometimes be overly (even dogmatically) committed to neutral or variance-based explanations for observed anomalies, even when the conventional explanation is highly plausible (ironically, I think this happens because people often apply Bayes’ Theorem-style reasoning implicitly, even if the statisticians forget to apply it explicitly).  I believe this is one of those situations.

That said, whether it stems from diminishing skills or ongoing psychological unrest, a significant and continuing Tiger decline is still a realistic possibility.  From the chart above, it should be clear that Tiger circa 2009 shouldn’t have any problem blowing past Jack, but what would happen if he were a different Tiger?  Fortunately for him, he has a long way to drop before being a non-factor.  For comparison, let’s look at the same graph as above, but for the 2nd-best player of the recent era, Phil Mickelson:

tiger, phil and jack_3492_image003

Mickleson’s averages are 9.2%, 35.8%, and 5.6%, respectively.  Half a Tiger would still be much better.  Of course, Mickelson has won 4 majors in recent years, but has still been much worse than Tiger: over that period his averages are 12.2%, 40.1%, and 14.3%.  It should not go without notice that if Tiger transformed into Phil Mickelson, played 7 more years, and won majors at the same rate that Mickelson has over the last 7 (Phil is about 6 years older), it would put him at exactly the magic number: 18.

Finally, let’s look at the graph for the man himself — Jack Nicklaus:

tiger, phil and jack_3492_image004

Note: For years prior to 1970, only official PGA Tour events are included.
Jack’s averages over this span (from the year he turned pro to the year of his final major) are 15.5%, 63.4%, and 18%.  These numbers are slightly understated, since in truth Jack was well past his prime when he won the Masters in ’86.  As we can see, Jack began to decline significantly around 1979, but still won 3 more majors after that point.  A similar pattern for Woods would put him at 17, and at least in contention for the record.  On the other hand, not everyone is Jack Nicklaus.  Nicklaus, incredibly, won a higher percentage of majors than tournaments overall.  This is especially apparent in his post-decline career:  note the small amount of blue compared to the amount of green from 1979 on.  Whether he just ran well in the right spots, or whether he had preternatural competitive spirit, not even Tiger Woods can count on having Nicklaus’s knack for winning majors.  So if Tiger hopes to catch up, he had better be out of his mind.

The Case for Dennis Rodman, Part 0/4—Outline

[Note: Forgive the anachronisms, but since this page is still the landing-spot for a lot of new readers, I’ve added some links to the subsequent articles into this post. There is also a much more comprehensive outline of the series, complete with a table of relevant points and a selection of charts and graphs available in The Case for Dennis Rodman: Guide.]

If you’ve ever talked to me about sports, you probably know that one of my pet issues (or “causes” as my wife calls them), is proving the greatness of Dennis Rodman.  I admit that since I first saw Rodman play — and compete, and rebound, and win championships — I have been fascinated.  Until recently, however, I thought of him as the ultimate outlier: someone who seemed to have unprecedented abilities in some areas, and unprecedented lack of interest in others.  He won, for sure, but he also played for the best teams in the league.  His game was so unique — yet so enigmatic — that despite the general feeling that there was something remarkable going on there, opinions about his ultimate worth as a basketball player varied immensely — as they continue to today.  In this four-part series, I will attempt to end the argument.

While there may be room for reasonable disagreement about his character, his sportsmanship, or how and whether to honor his accomplishments, my research and analysis has led me to believe — beyond a reasonable doubt — that Rodman is one of the most undervalued players in NBA history.  From an analytical perspective, leaving him off of the Hall of Fame nominee list this past year was truly a crime against reason.  But what makes this issue particularly interesting to me is that it cuts “across party lines”:  the conventional wisdom and the unconventional wisdom both get it very wrong.  Thus, by examining the case of Dennis Rodman, not only will I attempt to solve a long-standing sports mystery, but I will attempt to illustrate a few flaws with the modern basketball-analytics movement.

In this post I will outline the major prongs of my argument.  But first, I would like to list the frequently-heard arguments I will *not* be addressing:

  • “Rodman won 5 NBA titles!  Anyone who is a starter on 5 NBA champions deserves to be in the Hall of Fame!”  [As an intrinsic matter, I really don’t care that he won 5 NBA championships, except inasmuch as I’d like to know how much he actually contributed.  I.e., is he more like Robert Horry, or more like Tim Duncan?]
  • “Rodman led the league in rebounding *7 times*:  Anyone who leads the league in a major statistical category that many times deserves to be in the Hall of Fame!” [This is completely arbitrary.  Rodman’s rebounding prowess is indeed an important factor in this inquiry, but “leading the league” in some statistical category has no intrinsic value, except inasmuch as it actually contributed to winning games.]
  • “Rodman was a great defender!  He could effectively defend Michael Jordan and Shaquille O’Neal in their primes!  Who else could do that?” [Actually, I love this argument as a rhetorical matter, but unfortunately I think defensive skill is still too subjective to be quantified directly. Of course all of his skills — or lack thereof — are relevant to the bottom line.]
  • “Rodman was such an amazing rebounder, despite being only 6 foot 7!” [Who cares how tall he was, seriously?]

Rather, in the subsequent parts in this series, these are the arguments I will be making:

  1. Rodman was a better rebounder than you think: Rodman’s ability as a rebounder is substantially underrated.  Rodman was a freak, and is unquestionably — by a wide margin — the greatest rebounder in NBA history.  In this section I will use a number of statistical metrics to demonstrate this point (preview factoid: Kevin Garnett’s career rebounding percentage is lower than Dennis Rodman’s career *offensive* rebounding percentage).  I will also specifically rebut two common counterarguments: 1) that Rodman “hung out around the basket”, and only got so many rebounds because he focused on it exclusively [he didn’t], and 2) that Bill Russell and Wilt Chamberlain were better rebounders [they weren’t].
  2. Rodman’s rebounding was more valuable than you think: The value of Rodman’s rebounding ability is substantially underrated.  Even/especially by modern efficiency metrics that do not accurately reward the marginal value of extra rebounds.  Conversely, his lack of scoring ability is vastly overrated, even/especially by modern efficiency metrics that inaccurately punish the marginal value of not scoring.
  3. Rodman was a bigger winner than you think: By examining Rodman’s +/- with respect to wins and losses — i.e., comparing his teams winning percentages with him in the lineup vs. without him in the lineup — I will show that the outcomes suggest he had elite-level value.  Contrary to common misunderstanding, this actually becomes *more* impressive after adjusting for the fact that he played on very good teams to begin with.
  4. Rodman belongs in the Hall of Fame [or not]: [Note this section didn’t go off as planned.  Rodman was actually selected for the HoF before I finished the series, so section 4 is devoted to slightly more speculative arguments about Rodman’s true value.]  Having wrapped up the main quantitative prongs, I will proceed to audit the various arguments for and against Rodman’s induction into the Hall of Fame.  I believe that both sides of the debate are rationalizable — i.e., there exist reasonable sets of preferences that would justify either outcome.  Ultimately, however, I will argue that the most common articulated preferences, when combined with a proper understanding of the available empirical evidence, should compel one to support Rodman‘s induction.  To be fair, I will also examine which sets of preferences could rationally compel you to the opposite conclusion.

Stay tuned….

Hidden Sources of Error—A Back-Handed Defense of Football Outsiders

So I was catching up on some old blog-reading and came across this excellent post by Brian Burke, Pre-Season Predictions Are Still Worthless, showing that the Football Outsiders pre-season predictions are about as accurate as picking 8-8 for every team would be, and that a simple regression based on one variable — 6 wins plus 1/4 of the previous season’s wins — is significantly more accurate

While Brian’s anecdote about Billy Madison humorously skewers Football Outsiders, it’s not entirely fair, and I think these numbers don’t prove as much as they may appear to at first glance.  Sure, a number of conventional or unconventional conclusions people have reached are probably false, but the vast majority of sports wisdom is based on valid causal inferences with at least a grain of truth.  The problem is that people have a tendency to over-rely on the various causes and effects that they observe directly, conversely underestimating the causes they cannot see.

So far, so obvious.  But these “hidden” causes can be broken down further, starting with two main categories, which I’ll call “random causes” and “counter-causes”:

“Random causes” are not necessarily truly random, but do not bias your conclusions in any particular direction.  It is the truly random combined with the may-as-well-be-random, and generates the inherent variance of the system.

“Counter causes” are those which you may not see, but which relate to your variables in ways that counteract your inferences.  The salary cap in the NFL is one of the most ubiquitous offenders:  E.g. an analyst sees a very good quarterback, and for various reasons believes that QB with a particular skill-set is worth an extra 2 wins per season.  That QB is obtained by an 8-8 team in free agency, so the analyst predicts that team will win 10 games.  But in reality, the team that signed that quarterback had to pay handsomely for that +2 addition, and may have had to cut 2 wins worth of players to do it.  If you imagine this process repeating itself over time, you will see that the correlation between QB’s with those skills and their team’s actual winrate may be small or non-existent (in reality, of course, the best quarterbacks are probably underpaid relative to their value, so this is not a problem).  In closed systems like sports, these sorts of scenarios crop up all the time, and thus it is not uncommon for a perfectly valid and logical-seeming inference to be, systematically, dead wrong (by which I mean that it not only leads to an erroneous conclusion in a particular situation, but will lead to bad predictions routinely).

So how does this relate to Football Outsiders, and how does it amount to a defense of their predictions?  First, I think the suggestion that FO may have created “negative knowledge” is demonstrably false:  The key here is not to be fooled by the stat that they could barely beat the “coma patient” prediction of 8-8 across the board.  8 wins is the most likely outcome for any team ex ante, and every win above or below that number is less and less likely.  E.g., if every outcome were the result of a flip of a coin, your best strategy would be to pick 8-8 for every team, and picking *any* team to go 10-6 or 12-4 would be terrible.  Yet Football Outsiders (and others) — based on their expertise — pick many teams to have very good and very bad records.  The fact that they break even against the coma patient shows that their expertise is worth something.

Second, I think there’s no shame in being unable to beat a simple regression based on one extremely probative variable:  I’ve worked on a lot of predictive models, from linear regressions to neural networks, and beating a simple regression can be a lot of work for marginal gain (which, combined with the rake, is the main reason that sports-betting markets can be so tough).

Yet, getting beaten so badly by a simple regression is a definite indicator of systematic error — particularly since there is nothing preventing Football Outsiders from using a simple regression to help them make their predictions. Now, I suspect that FO is underestimating football variance, especially the extent of regression to the mean.  But this is a blanket assumption that I would happily apply to just about any sports analyst — quantitative or not — and is not really of interest.  However, per the distinction I made above, I believe FO is likely underestimating the “counter causes” that may temper the robustness of their inferences without necessarily invalidating them entirely.  A relatively minor bias in this regard could easily lead to a significant drop in overall predictive performance, for the same reason as above:  the best and worst records are by far the least likely to occur.  Thus, *ever* predicting them, and expecting to gain accuracy in the process, requires an enormous amount of confidence.  If Football Outsiders has that degree of confidence, I would wager that it is misplaced.

Player Efficiency Ratings—A Bold ESPN Article Gets it Exactly Wrong

Tom Haberstroh, credited as a “Special to ESPN Insider” in his byline, writes this 16 paragraph article, about how “Carmelo Anthony is not an elite player.” Haberstroh boldly — if not effectively — argues that Carmelo’s high shot volume and correspondingly pedestrian Player Efficiency Rating suggests that not only is ‘Melo not quite the superstar his high scoring average makes him out to be, but that he is not even worth the max contract he will almost certainly get next summer.  Haberstroh further argues that this case is, in fact, a perfect example of why people should stop paying as much attention to Points Per Game and start focusing instead on PER’s.

I have a few instant reactions to this article that I thought I would share:

  1. Anthony may or may not be overrated, and many of Haberstroh’s criticisms on this front are valid — e.g., ‘Melo does have a relatively low shooting percentage — but his evidence is ultimately inconclusive.
  2. Haberstroh’s claim that Anthony is not worth a max contract is not supported at all.  How many players are “worth” max contracts?  The very best players, even with their max contracts, are incredible value for their teams (as evidenced by the fact that they typically win).  Corollary to this, there are almost certainly a number of players who are *not* the very best, who nevertheless receive max contracts, and who still give their teams good value at their price.  (This is not to mention the fact that players like Anthony, even if they are overrated, still sell jerseys, increase TV ratings, and put butts in seats.)
  3. One piece of statistical evidence that cuts against Haberstroh’s argument is that Carmelo has a very solid win/loss +/- with the Nuggets over his career.  With Melo in the lineup, Denver has won 59.9% of their games (308-206), and without him in the lineup over that period, they have won 50% (30-30).  While 10% may not sound like much, it is actually elite and compares favorably to the win/loss +/- of many excellent players, such as Chris Bosh (9.1%, and one of the top PER players in the league) and Kobe Bryant (4.1%).  All of these numbers should be treated with appropriate skepticism due to the small sample sizes, but they do trend accurately.

But the main point I would like to make is that — exactly opposite Haberstrom — I believe Carmelo Anthony is, in fact, a good example of why people should be *more* skeptical of PER’s as the ultimate arbiter of player value. One of the main problems with PER is that it attempts to account for whether a shot’s outcome is good or bad relative to the average shot, but it doesn’t account for whether the outcome is good or bad relative to the average shot taken in context.  The types of shots a player is asked to take vary both dramatically and systematically, and can thus massively bias his PER.  Many “bad” shots, for example, are taken out of necessity: when the clock is winding down and everyone is defended, someone has to chuck it up.  In that situation, “bad” shooting numbers may actually be good, if they are better than what a typical player would have done.  If the various types of shots were distributed equally, this would all average out in the end, and would only be relevant as a matter of precision.  But in reality, certain players are asked to take the bad shot more often that others, and those players are easy enough to find: they tend to be the best players on their teams.

This doesn’t mean I think PER is useless, or irreparably broken.  Among other things, I think it could be greatly improved by incorporating shot-clock data as a proxy to model the expected value of each shot (which I hope to write more about in the future).  However, in its current form it is far from being the robust and definitive metric that many basketball analysts seem to believe.  Points Per Game may be an even more useless metric — theoretically — but at least it’s honest.